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Notes on Schumpeterian
Competitive Power
Shosuke Takemura
Introduction
I'm afraid Schumpeter couldn't finish depicting his own vision of
competitive power and / or monopolistic power in his works after all.
Though we can know his understanding about the formation and
movement of prices in competition and monopoly in his early work, for
example, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der Theoretischen
NationalOkonomie, it is no more than his elementary explanation about
the equilibrium theoretical essences in Austrian school economists and
others including Walras's and Bhom-Bawerk's works, exclusive of
Cournot and Marshall. In his later years' works, Business Cycles and
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, we can know he did his best to
depict the striking behavior of competitive monopolist and innovative
activity in the industrial society. I think he had been matured the
theoretical framework through these two books basing on Theory of
Economic Development he published before.
His penetrating view, so to speak, competitive power theory is my
own subject here. I like to call it rivalry. Especially I am interested in the
circumstances and features of cutting price used in order to expand
entreprenuer's profit by way of the full-cost principle under increasing
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returns to scale seeing in the level and output growth. And there is mostly
depicting a dynamic process of clever entrepreneur's R&D in the
industries by driving competitive power in the very monopolistic
circumstances, I guess. Schumpeter's true intention of his elaborate
research might exist in the following essence: An clever entrepreneur is
able to use his wisdom organizationally and effectively by creating,
processing and storing own scarce resources and own innovational
knowledge regarding timely opportunities for his survival.
Flexible and Fixed Price Economies
While Walrasian economists used to suppose all goods and services
are traded in a perfectly free market, Kaleckian economists did to suppose
they are traded mostly by way of the full cost principle. I like to propose to
call the former flexible price economy and the latter fixed price economy.
In general agricultural products are agreeable to price flexible market,
manufacturing products being to fixed price one. In real world we live in
the two-sided mixed economy. The introduction of full cost principle into
the present industrial society means that people have necessarily the
fixed price economy.
Table 1 shows ratio of primary industrial products to manufacturing
ones from 1960 to 1996 in several developed countries. These figures are
given in order to know mere historical trend. For instance in 1960 Japan
had very high ratio but it has rather low ratio in 1996. We can know
Japan and Germany is now typical fixed economies. Historically UK used
to show rather low ratio since the rise ofwell-known industrial revolution
in 19 th century'. USA and UK have higher ratios than other two
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1960
1970
1980
1990
1996
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Ratio ofprimary industrial products to manufacturing ones
Japan USA UK Germany
M ~ W W
~ U 8 8
13 11 7 6
9 11 8 5
6 10 9 4
France Italy
1960 31 58
1970 18 34
1980 18 21
1990 16 14
1996 12 11
Source: Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics -Japan and
Other Major Countries-, 1983-1998: to be calculated by
author
countries in Europe. Generally speaking every developed economy has a
common inclination to be fixed price economy with the years. I guess
Schumpeter will like to call this economy 'rigid price economy'. In fact he
has been very interested in the rigid price under monopolistic practices in
depression, not in prosperity in his 'plausible capitalism'. His view in
regard to depression is also worth thinking over once again.
His statements are as follows: -under the conditions created by
capitalist evolution, perfect and universal flexibility of prices might be
depression further unstabilize the system, instead of stabilizing it as it no
doubt would under the conditions envisaged by general theory. Again this
is to a large extent recognized in those cases in which the economist is in
sympathy with the interests immediately concerned, for instance in the
case of labor and of agriculture; in those cases he admits readily enough
that what looks like rigidity may be no more than regulated adaptation2-.
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He is likely to suppose these situations of rigid price will be observable in
the case of the formation of primary goods and factors of production both
in the periods of short-run and long-run. He distinguishes the lower limit
of competitive price from the upper one of monopoly price. Hereupon the
competitive price means that of equilibrium determined by the power of
competitive free market. In general every competitor in the market is
likely to offer rather lower price than the normal market price, if possible.
But he can't do it. As Stigler taught it to us admirably, -Of course if he
cuts price secretly and expands sales immensely, the other 99 firms (in
100 firms) will soon discover their sales are vanishing. But if he is
moderate in his sales (perhaps only doubling sales to 4 units) he will
reason that the price cutting will not be detected. This reasoning will also
be followed by at least 5 or 10 of the rivals, and if 10 double their sales to
4, only 160 (200-40) units will be demanded of the other sellers, each of
whom will suffer, with rising animosity, a decline of 11 per cent in sales.
This arithmetic portrays the history of a thousand price agreements. We
shall discuss monopoly which is what this is, but it seems appropriate to
emphasize here that large numbers of sellers not only make the formation
of collusive agreements difficult, but also encourage each individual seller
to violate the agreement"-. On the other hand monopolists hope to raise
the normal price owing to some monopolistic practices. Therefore every
monopolist is likely to propose his upper limit of equilibrium price,
namely, that equated marginal cost with marginal revenue. Though
practically he can afford to set the profit-maximizing price, he may dare
to cut the price to expand his profit, if possible.
I have a great interest in the optional amount of his profit in
changing the equilibrium price upwards or downwards. A great interest
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for us exists in whether each competitor or monopolist will be able to
expand his profit by falling his price not by raising it. Many economists
used to explain that the effect of price change on the amount of profit
depends on the extent of competition in the market. They surely believe
the larger the extent of that in the market becomes, the larger the extent
of efficiencies of every entrepreneur and of industrial organization
become. Is this belief agreeable? It is vital of us to notice the difference of
perfect competition and excessive competition. In fact this problem does
always appear in discussing competitive efficiency itself. The above two
words look like even similar meaning at a glance. The former means
competition is excessive but the latter means monopoly is excessive. Here
I like to say little competition means much rivalry. I like to reckon the
traditional competitive monopoly to be 'competitive power' defined anew
now, including monopolistic competition. To tell the truth Schumpeter
might not like the theory of monopolistic competition itself, as
Chamberlin himself poured forth his heart'. However cynically
Schumpeter's vision about monopoly is more akin to monopolistic
competition theory rather than oligopoly theory, I guess.
Now the new word 'rivalry' does not acquire its citizenship in a well-
known standard economic theory yet. Though in rivalry theory every
producer produces differential goods and services each other, he has many
competitors in the market. Here I dare to adopt the concept of 'rivalry' in
behalf of the familiar 'competition' only in the monopolistic theory.
Besides there are some industrial circumstances we must distinct
'competition' from 'rivalry'. They are equivalent to his own peculiar
industrial circumstances which Schumpeter himself has often picked up
in his works. Many outstanding economists have taught us definition of
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'competition' including three fundamental conditions, namely,
innumerable participants, non-differential products and entirely free
entry and exit. There are two factors affording a kind of creative
destruction to the existing innovative activity and industrial structure.
One is price-type factor and the other is non-price one. The former is
about the price formation and movement of goods and services. The latter
includes 'innovation variable' -total output, method of production,
organizational efficiency, profit and the like- and 'strategy variable' -
products differentiation, market for sales, routes of materials, R&D and
the like. Innovation variable is closely connected with strategy one. For
instance when an entrepreneur succeeds in R&D and / or products
differentiation, he is able to expand his output and profit. In my opinion
Schumpeter attached a special importance to these two non-price type
variables with price-type variable. These variables often cause rivalry in
behalf of monopolistic forces itself as a kind of competitive power in
monopolistic circumstance. Schumpeter told us about an elementary
competitive process of economic development, -In general it is not the
owner of stage- coaches who builds railways. This fact not only puts the
discontinuity which characterizes the process we want to describe in a
special light, and creates so to speak still another kind of discontinuity
(that is, replacement of main innovator) in addition to the one mentioned
above (that is, displacement of the equilibrium state previously existing),
but it also explains important features of the course of events. Especially
in a competitive economy, in which new combinations mean the
competitive elimination of the old, it explains on the one hand the process
by which individuals and families rise and fall economically and socially
and which is peculiar to this form of organization, as well as a whole
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series of other phenomena ofbusiness cycle5-.
Now the features of new concept 'rivalry' are as follows. The first is
that price is not always distant from marginal cost, including the case of
equating price with marginal cost. On Producer's side relating price with
profit is more important than relating price with quantity. Speaking
correctly so-called 'excessive competition' occurs often even among perfect
competitive entrepreneurs. This fact doesn't mean too little competition is
too much rivalry. The second is that differentiation of products exists
definitely in the market among all producers. There is surely visible
differentiation even among the delicate airline transportation services
supplied by different airline companies. In such situations the supply of
consumer's goods and services is subject to mass consumption method and
raises the purchasing power of the wage dollar. And in the semi-
conductor industry the name of country and ofthe maker it is produced in,
for example, Intel or Toshiba come to a vital differentiation. The third is
that barriers of entry and exit are dependent on not only the size of
production cost but also rivalry situations with many potential suppliers.
Rivalry holds good to make clear discretion of non-price type variable. In
the chance of R&D under rivalry situations a considerably high growth
rate of demand lead up necessarily rather high technological efficiency.
The advantage by this rivalry can induce the entrepreneur realize an
experience rule of cost, that is, economy of scale or increasing returns to
scale. Besides he is able to get another economic advantages from
economy of scope and learning by doing. An efficient technological
innovation means that of process of production, quality of products and
new market for sales including improving the delicacy of services on
producer's side. Sooner or later a drastic price falling is realized in the
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market of rivalry through cost falling. In this connection Schumpeter used
to refer to the railroad as transportation (a kind of services) industry and
the automobile as manufacturing industry. As Schumpeter told us, -The
capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk
stockings for queens but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls
in return for steadily decreasing amounts ofeffort"-.
Next we will see what happened in the profit when the action of entry
took place timely in the airline industry. We'll see briefly its case in
deregulation in 1970's especially in USA.
What Happened to their Profits in Rivalry?
Though airline suppliers could be supposed to make large profit at
high price only if they attract consumers, they couldn't cut price to attract
consumers away from their other suppliers. Under any regulation they
were confronted with the problem of making itself more attractive than
other suppliers by other means than cutting price. At first 'in regulation'
floor price was fixed at the higher than competitive equilibrium price.
Every carrier could get sufficient profit without fearing potential entry by
new comers. But the coming deregulatory policy obliged to cut the price
down under the existing price and to acquire less profit than before. Why
did the profit happen to cut? As a matter of fact this is a key point to
discuss the innovational economic effects under falling of normal prices.
When suppliers are in monopolistic circumstances on the basis of the
existing regulated fixed price and they can afford to use their competitive
power, that is, rivalry a kind of antinomy may emerge. In traditional
economics falling of price is explained by competition in the market. But
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this competitive mechanism can't explain the size and direction of profit
effects well. Then each entrepreneur has the above non-price type
variable (innovation one and strategy one) with price-type variable.
Economist Jordan wrote the essences in his book, -The existence of
rivalry among certificated carriers may be considered evidence by some
that the cab-regulated airlines do not comprise a cartel. It is important,
however, to distinguish between the rivalry for large shares of cartel
production quotas and profits, and competition as a kind of market
structure. The semantic problem is compounded because in a world of
scarcity there is continual and universal competition for goods among
rival individuals and group or organization, regardless of the structure
within which is competition occurs. Under differing market structures,
only the form of competition changes.... therefore, the relevant question
regarding the airlines becomes: is the form of competition among the
regulated airlines consistent with the implications of the producer-
protection (cartel) hypothesis? The purpose of the cartel is to increase its
members' profits .... over what could be achieved if the industry were no
cartelized'-. His cartel hypothesis consists of three conditions. The points
are as follows. The first is effectively limited entry and exit. The second is
highly controlled and discriminated price. The third is service at lower
quantities of output and at the higher quality level. These three points
are surely reasonable. As he properly pointed out there, highly controlled
and discriminated price combines with limited entry and lower quantity
of output. Besides the price level can serve to expand profit for cartel
members.
Though he was interested in a peculiar kind of cartel that California
intrastate airlines faced in the 1960's, he didn't develop the modern
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theory of cartel there. Who knows whether there were a true cartel or the
like in the then industry? Generally speaking 'cartel' is supposed to be
formed in market structure which many economists used to call
'oligopoly'. This type is a kind of 'group equilibrium' working in the
industrial organization known as Chamberlin's monopolistic competition.
It is in no doubt rivalry situations. However rivalry doesn't always
require any limited conditions of entry and exit. Here is a difference
between rivalry theory and traditional monopolistic competition. Though
cartel is itself illegal, when the Regulation Board practices his policies as
if he approves the action of cartel, it will become to be legal contrary to the
entreprenuer's will. Schumpeter has approved the existence of cartel. He
said, -our argument does not cover all cases of restrictive or regulating
strategy, many of which no doubt have that injurious effect on the long-
run development of output... the net effect is a question of the
circumstances and of the way in which and the degree to which industry
regulates itself in each individual case. It is certainly as conceivable that
an all-pervading cartel system might sabotage all progress as it is that
might realize, with smaller social and private costs, all that perfect
competition is supposed to realizeB-. In fact we can see a lot of cases the
Board could approve it under nominal 'industrial rationalization or
contract for production quotas' in the peculiar depression of the developed
countries (Viscusi and others, 1998).
Hereafter I like to study a theory of cartel under rivalry. At first I'll
see rivalry with contract for production quotas in R&D activity. In the
Fig. 1 downward sloping dd is entrepreneur's demand curve and upward
sloping LMC and SMC are his long-run and short-run marginal cost
curves. LAC and SAC are average cost curves in the same way. MR is
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marginal revenue curve. When the market is under a monopolistic
circumstances, the Point (pl, q,) corresponding to the intersection of two
curves MR and SMC is his profit maximizing point in the short run. In the
cartel some of members, however, will dare to expand their profits, if
possible. He can justify his quota with the same price. Now if he expand
his capacity by 1 / 4 owing to R&D activity, he can afford to sell q2
equating with 5/ 4 times as much as his present demand.
The cost ofR & D must make LMC shift upward to LMC'. Though the
long-run cost increase, his profit will expand by the shaded area. Stigler
told us the cartel's life, -This is the story of cartels' lives. When this
rivalry does not take the form of investment, some other form achieves
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the same result. Thus some states have had laws that no one could sell
liquor, or gasoline, or some other commodity at less than a designated
price or mark-up. A firm will then seek additional patronage by
advertising more, giving better service, or some such device. As a result,
the cost curves shift upward, and in long-run equilibrium, the long run
marginal cost eventually equals price9-Though there are several types of
cartels in modern economic theory, I guess the cartel which Schumpeter
had imaged at that times is the above R&D type. The reason is that this
type has R&D as a strategy variable and profit as a innovation variable.
Among them the innovation variable is supposed to be a result of being a
timely creative innovation.
By the way the experience of regulatory policy in the airline industry
began by issuing Civil Aeronautics Act (CAA) in USA in 1938. The
interest of every airline company under the governmental regulation was
definitely in the formation of price, profit and safety. The policy of
regulation ended by issuing of Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) in 1978.
Forty years had passed till the deregulation policy was invoked. Then
main interest of the carriers were in sustaining competitive power in the
industry and expanding his sales and profit by using the creative
innovation. That includes increasing profit by advertising more often,
producing more delicate services and reforming new organization. At that
times at the first time the word of 'deregulation' appeared and many
economists were going to discuss the effects of the deregulation of
government. What is the theoretical framework explaining the effects?
There we can see three vital features. The first is existence of
organizational vertical integration. The second is timely chance of
additive R&D activity induced by advantage of cost falling. The third is
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sustainability of rivalry for acquiring larger share of own sales in the
market. All ofthree features belong to the factors on supplier side.
Besides it is safe to say there are more three factors from the view of
industrial policy of deregulation. The first is effects of change of relative
prices among several products. The second is effects of controlling barriers
of entry and exit through the industrial policy concerned. The third is
effects of deregulatory policies on the entrepreneur's budget constraint
and potential response to the collusive members. To our regret
Schumpeter didn't research these features elaborately.
Mter approving Schumpeter's vision that 'capitalist economy' is a
organic but restrictive or regulating process and market power, namely,
some protection from a competitive forcing of prices toward the marginal
cost is essential to successful innovation, Mason told us the following
about Schumpeter's anti-trust ideologies, -His critique is drastic and
effective because it plausibly undermine s the two main pillars of the
traditional ideology: first, that market power is the proper object of
attack since power means the ability to exploit; and, second, that the
preservation of competition, meaning the exclusion of positions of market
power, will assure the efficient use of resources. The essence of
Schumpeter's position is that market power is necessary to innovation
and that innovation is the core of effective competition1o-.
Schumpeterian Productive Process
At first we like to formulate implicit flow-fund type production
function and mark-up principle. Our interest is whether it could be useful
to understand an innovative activity in the factory of the firm. An
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innovation happens in cooperation with productivities of capital and
labor.
qt = 8F(lt , kt ; Itdt, ktdt)
dP/dt = dLMC(l + ill)/dt
ill = e/(e - s)
Here It and kt mean quantities of capital and labor. qt is output. These
two are measured by 'fund' with time t. And I,dt and ktdt are measured by
'flow'. P and LMC are price and long-run marginal cost. 8 is time interval
as the working day of the factory, so to speak, a kind of dynamic factor
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Three values ill, e and s are 'mark-up',
elasticity of demand and market share. They are supposed to measure on
both fund of goods and flow of services. This mark-up is equal to the ratio
of price to its marginal cost. And this production function is almost subject
to increasing returns to scale. LAC cost curves are supposed to be led from
cost minimizing method, after considering productive effects of funds and
services in the above production function.
In Fig. 2 we can depict the relation of cutting of price and R&D
activity. The vertical axis measures price and cost and the horizontal axis
does output of products. The downward sloping curve, DD, is 'firm's
expected demand curve'. In this diagram there are two kinds of LAC
curves. One is long-run average cost curve (LAC') with prime before
adding mark-up ill and the other is short-run curve (LAC) without prime
after adding the mark-up. There are four points from (PI, ql) to (P3, q3) on
the two demand curves. LACI and LAC2 are separable each other. LACI
means higher cost than LAC2 • When one innovative activity, that is, R &
D happens, LACI curve can shift and jump to LAC2 at the lower part than
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LACI • We can call the concerned zone from PI to ps, namely, from ql to qs
'administrative production-horizon' (Takemura, 1997). With my keen
interest Schumpeter had also touched upon the importance of such
administrative zone (Schumpeter, 1939). The firm is both able to shift
from one LAC curve to another one and able to cut the price of his product
by taking a timely innovational chance for R&D. A clever entrepreneur
merely implements this R&D activity to gain his additional profit in the
end.
As Schumpeter also used to emphasize of importance of the rate of
increase of total output, Schumpetarian economists will introduce
productivity of factor of production in the production function. Nelson and
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Winter (1982) and Winter (1991) developed an evolutionary theory of
technical change and simulations of expected level of innovative potential
entry in the system he call Schumpeterian regimes. He said on the
postulates of his growth model, -The model employed is a Markov model
of a single industry in which firms produce homogeneous product and in
which cost reduction through productivity improvement is the major
competitive weaponll-. He also referred to the situations of relatively
restrained competition, of a mark-up factor formula based on the
'Cournot conjecture' I didn't dare to state explicitly. From the sight of
individual firm the rate of expansion of total output change will depend
on the rate of price change. We can say mark-up ill changes with the level
of market share and the net return ofR & D concerned.
Semmler said on Schumpeter's theory in contrast to Marx, -first,
competition is not limited to price or quantity adjustments. It is described
as an evolutionary process, as a process of 'creative destruction'. The
engines of this development are large firms.... The incentives for
developing these types of technical change originate in transient surplus
profit.... The most important variable for this evolutionary process is the
size of the firm.... second, Schumpeter stresses that competition is not
necessarily an equilibrating force. When referring to the existence oflarge
firms and their rivalry.... third, as in Marx, competition is an evolutionary
process, one of rivalry between firms motivated by the search for surplus
profit. He calls this surplus profit the transient 'monopoly profit' of new
processes and new products: "Thus it is true that there is or may be an
element of genuine monopoly gain in those entrepreneurial profits which
are the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful innovator.... in
Schumpeter's view, the large firms are powerful engines of progress and
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in particular ofthe long-run expansion of total output'H2-.
Generally in being competition any entrepreneur can't yet survive
unless he uses his weapon named his new business opportunity of
advantage coming from new innovational technology in his own economic
and managerial world, as Hayek (1948) taught us. Also although by
'invisible Goddess' Hand the merit of every entrepreneur's existing
opportunity disappears sooner or later, the entrepreneur has yet strong
incentive to create the next new innovational technology. Even if the
equilibrium has come, he can break its equilibrium situation and readjust
the market by using his own strong incentive. He can always endeavor to
decrease total production cost by falling labor cost and capital cost and the
other production cost including transaction cost. He can do it by his own
incentive coming from strong expectation of additional advantage for new
technological innovation. Technology itself doesn't always fall cost, but
entrepreneurs' hard effort to adapt his technological innovation to R&D
activity. That is because the activity needs clever and feasible strategies
of every entrepreneur concerned.
Hesitating timely R&D activity is severe for entrepreneur's own
survival in chronic depression of the economy. In some industries, for
example, semi-conductor, automobile and transportation the growth of
demand is rather high. There used to be piecemeal falling price in the
long-run with the rise of productivity of output. In this type of rivalry
suppliers are apt to have moderate concentration of sellers, but to change
frequently their own percentage of market share. Each supplier will
endeavor to win large merit coming from some variables of strategy and
innovation mentioned before. Even if the price can overshoot to the lowest
level with almost null profit, there will be the force of recovery to a kind of
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pseudo stable equilibrium, in other words, 'the problem of
indeterminateness' of final stable equilibrium in Scumpeter's theory. By
Schumpeter's vision there is not always a plain economic reason for its
equilibrating mechanism toward recovery. In rivalry there is
indeterminateness (so to speak, rigid disequilibrium regime) from a
theoretical standpoint, as he is also observing. An existence of this
mechanism forms an important non-barrier for entry. That is reason why
market share is able to keep up surplus profit. And it will lead to larger
mark-up ill through being unelastic in demand.
Concluding Remarks
Schumpeter used to reckon Walras to be a great theoretical
economist. We can see it by the fact he began proposing Walras's
theoretical framework in his first book, namely, Das Wesen und der
Hauptinhalt der Theoretischen NationalOkonomie. I didn't, however, dare
to come into the exchange theory of Walras and the contents of the above
Schumpeter's book. Because we can't truly understand his 'competitive
power' in his view about a certain mixed structure with monopoly and
competition, that is, the 'rivalry' which is my typical subject.
Hansen told us Schumpeter's theoretical core admirably. Those are as
follows. -Under the impulse of innovational activity, the economic system
draws away from the neighborhood of equilibrium. But the farther it
moves away from equilibrium the stronger is the fall back to equilibrium.
In the downward readjustment the economy is likely to "overshoot". Again
the economy is pulled back toward equilibrium. Mter this process of
adaptation and adjustment, this recovered neighborhood of equilibrium
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offers a favorable climate for a renewed surge of innovation. Thus in a
very fundamental sense, Schumpeter's theory runs in terms of an
endogeneous, self-perpetuating process, a process inherent in the inner
nature of a dynamic economy.... Rather he followed Juglar's lead -the
'only cause of the depression is prosperity.' This statement he interpreted
to mean that depression is nothing more than the economic system's
reaction to the distortions of the boom; it is the 'adaptation to the
situation into which the boom brings the system'. Innovations inject
disturbances into the system. These disturbances cannot be currently and
smoothly absorbed. They are 'big' and they disrupt the existing system
and enforce a distinct and often painful process of adaptation.... The
economic nature ofthe depression lies in the diffusion ofthe achievements
of the boom over the whole economic system through the process of the
struggle for equilibrium13-.
The theory of competitive power in Schumpeter's work found us to be
difficult. We can't afford to see this kind of theory in his some works,
exclusive of his two books, that is, Business Cycles and Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy. Though we can feel the existence of a unique
mixed theory of competition and monopoly, we can't correctly understand
it because he didn't propose his concrete model in his work, I guess.
Human beings are able to use their wisdom organizationally and
effectively by creating, processing and storing own scarce resources and
own innovational knowledge of opportunities for their survival. Public
interest means total of social surplus being supported and created by
individual interest. Properly speaking the government used to implement
a series of new regulations under the slogan of priority of public interest
in order to maximize social surplus artificially. But the government will
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fail in the end. Although in a human society the portion of total social
surplus was shared among private producers and consumers, private
producers get larger portion of it after all. The producer has been the only
economic unit who shares larger gain from additive for R&D. So-called
government failure has been caused by the fact that government herself is
not only an experimenter who experiments on creating public interest but
also an experimental testee suffering such a test.
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Notes
1. This table is dependent on an excellent idea of Morishima (1984, p. 39). He is
making the following table there. The numerical value is by %.
Year U.K. Germany France Italy
1801 139
1825-1835 200
1841 65
1860-1869 133 275
1872-1882 140
1896-1900 46 214
1901 15
1907 18 95
1913 51 214
1919 16 181
1929 13 33 138
1939 13 103
1949 15 23 30 91
1959 10 15 23 59
-Ratio of agricultural output to manufacturing output-
2. Schumpeter (1943), p. 95.
3. Stigler (1966), p. 91.
4. As Chamberlin told us, Schumpeter used to think 'monopolistic competition' is not
vital in 'the stationary or circular flow' at the least. See Chamberlin (1991) in Wood
(ed.), pp. 214-222.
5. Schumpeter (1934) pp. 66-67.
6. Schumpeter (1943), p. 67.
7. Jordan Wl70), p. 6.
8. Schumpeter (1943), p. 91.
9. Stigler (1966), p. 235-236.
10. Mason (1991), pp. 223-224.
11. Nelson and Winter (1982) and specially Winter (1991 pp. 271-304). In his model
mark-up formula is m = {e +(l - s)1/J}!{e - s + (1 - s)1/J}. Here e and s mean
elasticity of demand and market share, under the given 'Cournot Conjecture' factor
1/J influenced by the elasticity of supply curve. By his simulation when s increases e
decreases, in other words, demand becomes more unelastic with the restrained
entry.... In the case of 1/J = O. it is equal to the ordinary mark-up in the text.
12. Semmler (1991), pp. 76-78.
13. Hansen (1991). p. 211.
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There is a saying that 'look before you leap'. Though many economists
look to be acquainted with the commonly accepted vision of Schumpeter, I
am wondering if it isn't time now to think over the appropriateness. His
view about a certain mixed structure with monopoly and competition is
the typical subject. In this paper I'll focus his logic of the competitive
power I've seen in his several works. The main points are as follows. His
competitive power vision is well understood by utilizing a certain meaning
of 'rivalry' I call it. The reason is simply that this kind of power is
agreeable to producing innovative activities. As some conclusions I will
assert that Schumpeter's competitive power is filled with lots of splendid
ideas for the modern economic theory. His prominent point, so to speak,
consists in the balance between the innovative activities and the possible
equilibrium in rivalry.
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